

PART 2
A TOOLBOX OF MEASURES
TO ENHANCE SECURITY
ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

Introduction

A number of confidence-building measures may be identified that would be generally applicable within all—military and non-military—sectors. These include both measures that could be implemented at the initial stages of a peace process and those that could become relevant at later stages.

As developed in the European and most other theatres, CBMs have centred on ground forces and their equipment. More recently, the use of non-military confidence-enhancing measures, or CEMs, in nearly all peace processes worldwide indicate their relevance. In Europe, arms control measures have been taken for the cooperative handling of matters related to new threats such as constraints on terrorist-relevant weapons, the control and elimination of potentially dangerous stockpiles of arms, ammunition and toxic fuel, and so on. Another element in the European record has been the development of an agreed politico-military Code of Conduct which tends both to discipline and to harmonize the way that states conduct their defence and security business internally, thus overlapping with other endeavours that have aimed to promote common standards of security sector reform and good governance throughout the region.

As noted in the analytical part of this report, while this European *acquis* is uniquely broad it does not exhaust the full range of possible measures—including some that have actually been adopted in other regions. The specificities of a non-European region and the nature of today's security agenda both make it necessary to look not only at the applicability of OSCE-style categories of measures, but also at other questions such as naval and air forces CBMs, civilian CEMs and CBMs addressing weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It is extremely important that the choice of which CBM is used, as well as considerations on how it is implemented, be taken by the parties directly involved (i.e. North Korea and South Korea—and, secondly, also China, Japan, Russia and the USA). A third party or parties can become involved in facilitating this process in a consultative manner but must leave the ownership in the hands of the conflict parties.

The toolbox is structured in sections, and within each section CBMs are listed roughly according to the phases of a peace process in which they could be used. *Section A* looks at general capacity-building steps, both of a military and a non-military nature. Such steps may be the first before any of the other CBMs can be applied. *Section B* examines general military CBMs, focusing on some of the tougher CBM issues that have to be addressed in order to move ahead. A CBM package involving the confirmation or expansion of demilitarized or disengagement zones is also presented. *Section C* considers CBMs for land forces, the traditional type of CBMs familiar in the European context. *Section D* addresses naval and maritime CBMs that have an impact not just on the two Korean

states, but also on the other states that share the adjoining waters. *Section E* deals with specific aerial and space CBMs, including further or different uses of aerial observation and includes a subsection on missiles, *section F* focuses on CEMs and on measures with mixed military–civilian applications, including measures of a more purely humanitarian and socio-economic nature such as those that already are a part of the inter-Korean agenda (e.g. border crossings, reunification of families, joint industrial and infrastructure projects, tourism, etc.). Finally, *section G* considers certain measures that could be taken in the field of WMD.

A. Capacity building

Both North and South Korea could benefit from learning more about the purposes, forms, functions and implementation of CBMs. The amount of learning required is, however, very different between the two states. A lot of theoretical information exists in South Korea, stemming largely from the large number of academic studies that have been carried out on the topic. South Korea has also gained considerably in this regard from its observer (‘partnership’) status at the OSCE. Furthermore, South Korea has some experience in the practical implementation of CBMs, since it participates in two broad regional and global arrangements, namely the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) and the the Association of South East Asian Nations Regional Forum. Within the latter, it has regularly taken part in the work of the so-called Intersessional Support Groups on CBMs and high-level defence contacts, sent observers to and notified military exercises, submitted and exchanged annual defence statements and White Papers, and so on. As opposed to South Korea, North Korea arguably lacks both an up-to-date frame of reference and practical knowledge and experience of CBMs, making the task much more complicated. It is therefore evident that a good deal of work would have to be done in this regard.

MEASURE 1

TRAINING PROGRAMMES

South and North Koreans would be invited to participate in training programmes on various aspects of CBMs. Such training programmes could initially be carried out outside the Korean peninsula. If possible, it would be of great value if North and South Korean officials could participate jointly. However, if this is not possible, separate programmes could initially be organized. A number of actors could carry out such programmes, most notably the OSCE and its participating states. China may also play an important role in this regard, given its experience with confidence building within the Shanghai

Five framework and bilaterally with India. At the initial stages, the main target groups of such programmes would be North and South Korean government officials and high-ranking military personnel. The programmes would involve instruction on the history of CBMs in Europe and other areas, the contents of the major CBMs accords, the purposes and value of the individual measures, and practical aspects of implementation and compliance.

With regard to the last of these, if North Korea could be admitted to the OSCE's Partners for Co-operation group, it could start attending the working sessions of the annual implementation assessment mechanism.

One specific type of CBM training programme could deal with mediation, peace processes and CEMs. This could help contextualize CBMs as tools of a multidimensional peace process. The potential and limits of military and non-military CBMs could be explored, and specific communication, facilitation and process tools to help their implementation could be illustrated. Subsequent training programmes could address more technical aspects of the implementation of specific CBMs, and would preferably involve lower-level government officials and military personnel. These could take place on the Korean peninsula, in order to reach as large a number of personnel as possible. The following are examples of topics that could be included in these training programmes:

- training in the various aspects of a comprehensive approach to peace processes
- the format and procedures for the prior notification of military exercises
- the production of defence White Papers (for North Korea only)
- reporting on military holdings and acquisitions
- cooperative aerial monitoring (Open Skies)

MEASURE 2

GUEST RESEARCHERS AT FOREIGN RESEARCH INSTITUTES

Several European research institutes have hosted North and South Korean scholars and government officials for shorter periods of time in order to study various security-related topics. This experience could be built on after the start of a peace process. The target group of such guest scholars would be the same as for the training programmes. Researchers, government officials, and military officers could be invited to spend a certain amount of time (up to 6 months) studying CBM processes and gaining broader expertise in the security policies and thinking of other regions.

MEASURE 3

OBSERVATION OF CBM IMPLEMENTATION

North and South Korean military officers could be invited to observe specific CBMs being implemented in Europe or elsewhere. Such observations could be organized

as part of the training programmes mentioned above, or they could be carried out separately. Initially, high-ranking officers could be invited, but progressively the visits would target lower ranking officers who are actually involved in the implementation of the various CBMs.

One special activity that North and South Koreans could benefit from observing in this manner is the implementation of the Treaty on Open Skies in the OSCE area. The officers could be invited to participate in the observation flights and to see for themselves how the equipment on the aircraft functions, as well as how information is reported and shared after the flight.

B. General military confidence building

B1. Enhancing inter-Korean military communication

To date, a number of agreements have been made to install direct communication links, or ‘hotlines’, between the South and North Korean militaries. The first such attempt was included in the 1972 Joint Communiqué, which decided that a direct telephone line would be installed between Seoul and Pyongyang. Similarly, the 1991 Basic Agreement provided for the installation and operation of a direct telephone line between the respective military authorities. However, these hotlines were never installed or operated. Other hotlines have been installed since the 2000 summit meeting of the presidents of the two Koreas. In 2002 a hotline was established specifically for the reconnection of railroads and roads across the border, and in 2004 a naval hotline was installed and tested in order to avert repetitions of the naval clashes of 1999 and 2002 along the UN Command’s Northern Limit Line (NLL).

The general purpose of such hotlines is to help defuse moments of heightened tension and avoid misunderstandings by allowing speedy communication with the other side in unusual circumstances. The hotlines have been installed in other regions and contexts, with varying success and implementation. Following the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, a hotline was installed between Moscow and Washington and it has proved successful ever since. A series of hotlines have also been installed at different levels of governmental authority between India and Pakistan. These have, however, fallen in and out of use depending on the positions of those currently in power in the two states.

The following measures could be implemented in order to enhance inter-Korean military communication:

MEASURE 4

REINSTALLING THE TELEPHONE LINE ENVISIONED IN THE 1991 BASIC AGREEMENT

A direct telephone line between the military authorities should be established and operated, as envisioned in the Basic Agreement for use at times of heightened tension; as a means to gain clarification of unusual events, such as large-scale troop movements or misdirected missile tests; or for use in the case of natural disasters. The installation of a hotline between military authorities rather than political authorities is advisable as the militaries will be in a better position to provide information quickly. The telephone link could later be supplemented by a fax link.

Establishing the hotline would require the following:

- Resolving technical issues related to laying a telephone line across the DMZ.
- Establishing standard operating procedures for the hotline.
- Testing of the hotline. Following the initial tests, this could be done on a monthly basis in order to ensure the continued operability of the hotline.
- The operation of the hotline should be subject to periodic review within a bilateral North–South dialogue framework.

MEASURE 5

ESTABLISHING HOTLINES AT OTHER LEVELS

Once the main telephone link between military authorities is established and tested, hotlines can be established at different levels within the military. These could be modelled on the at least partly successful hotlines established for the reconnection of railroads and roads in 2002 and for the West Sea navies in 2004. These telephone links could be used to resolve smaller and local incidents, such as accidental shooting into the DMZ and unexpected or emergency entries into the DMZ. The links would connect local commanders facing each other at various points across the DMZ. This would require much the same technical preparations as for the main hotline, and should also be subject to regular testing and operational review within the bilateral dialogue framework. If such matters cannot be resolved at the local level, they could be referred to the main hotline between military authorities.

MEASURE 6

ESTABLISHING A CRISIS MANAGEMENT/CONFLICT PREVENTION CENTRE

Such a centre would be part of the bilateral dialogue framework. The main purpose of the centre would be to assist the established political body/bodies in reducing the risk of conflict. It would deal with the implementation of such CBMs as exchange of military information, cooperation regarding unusual activities and hazardous incidents of a military nature, intrusions into the DMZ and communications issues of general character.

B2. Initiating military contacts and exchanges

The 1991 Basic Agreement mandated the Joint Military Commission (JMC), established under the agreement, to discuss exchanges of military personnel. However, the JMC never came into existence and such discussions did not take place, in other negotiation frameworks either, so no contacts have ever ensued. Initiating various military contacts and exchanges following the start of a peace process could contribute significantly to enhancing confidence and trust, as it would accustom force personnel on each side to each other and could help break down negative images. Such exchanges could also lay the groundwork for more substantial cooperation at later stages of the peace process.

There are several precedents from other regions and contexts of such exchanges and contacts successfully being employed as CBMs. In Europe, the successive Vienna CSBM Documents have included chapters on military contacts and exchanges, with a mix of voluntary and obligatory measures. Other CBM agreements in non-European regions have also mandated such exchanges and contacts, such as the 1996 Shanghai Agreement on Confidence-Building in the Military Field in the Border Area between China and Russia plus three Central Asian republics (China–Russia + 3).

On the Korean peninsula, it would be advisable to arrange voluntary (and possibly obligatory) measures in this field. It would probably be more acceptable at the early stages if such contacts and exchanges took place between non-combat personnel of the military services. These exchanges could then be extended to combat personnel as the peace process matures. The following forms of contact and exchange could be considered for the Korean peninsula following the start of a peace process.

MEASURE 7

MUTUAL VISITS BY HIGH-RANKING MILITARY OFFICERS

At the early stages of a peace process, agreement could be reached on promoting exchange visits of high-ranking officers. These events would most likely be more formal events than the exchanges of academics. The initial exchanges need not involve substantial discussions, but rather formal exchanges of courtesies.

MEASURE 8

EXCHANGES BETWEEN ACADEMICS AND EXPERTS

Academics and experts on various aspects of security could exchange visits to each others' respective institutions in order to exchange ideas on different aspects of the security situation on the Korean peninsula and in the North-East Asian region. Such

exchanges would ideally involve professors or researchers at the respective military academies, but could also involve representatives from defence research institutes (in the case of South Korea) or from the Institute of Disarmament and Peace of the DPRK's Foreign Ministry.

If it proves difficult to agree on such exchanges taking place within the Korean peninsula, meetings and exchanges could be arranged in a third country. For example, meetings could take place in China or in a country outside the North-East Asian region. Such contacts and exchanges could build on the experiences gained from the CBM training programmes, as suggested above. Once sufficient confidence has been developed, the activities could be moved to the Korean peninsula.

MEASURE 9

EXCHANGES AND VISITS BETWEEN LOWER-RANKING COMBAT PERSONNEL

As in Europe and Central Asia, exchanges and visits could gradually also involve lower-rank military personnel. The following are some suggestions for the forms such exchanges could take.

- Reciprocal invitations could be extended for celebrations of national holidays or other festivities. If this proves controversial, a special North–South 'reconciliation' day could be designated, and celebrated annually with military ceremonies. Such ceremonies could build on the exchanges that have already been made to celebrate anniversaries of the 2000 summit meeting.
- Sporting events could be organized on a regular basis for members of the respective armed forces. These could be held alternately at locations in North and South Korea.

MEASURE 10

JOINT RESPONSE IN EMERGENCIES

Once the peace process has progressed sufficiently, military exchanges and contacts could take more substantive forms, such as planning and training for a joint response to emergencies.

This is a measure that has been agreed to in Latin America within the Organization of American States framework, while, the OSCE's Vienna CSBM Document provides for voluntary joint exercises and training 'to work on tasks of mutual concern'. There are several types of emergencies that could be planned for. Initially, planning could be made for a joint response to relatively minor incidents, such as joint search-and-rescue activities following accidents at sea. Later, more large-scale cooperation plans could be made. For example, a plan could be worked out for a joint response to natural disasters, such as the flooding that occurs frequently on the Korean peninsula.

The following steps could be taken in order to implement this measure:

- Open communication channels between the respective authorities responsible for search and rescue at sea, especially the respective coast guards; and
- Exchange of current plans and procedures for search and rescue activities at sea. These plans would then have to be compared in order to identify points of similarity and difference.
- Observers could be exchanged to observe training for search and rescue at sea.
- Initiating work on a plan for joint search and rescue at sea. This could be done in a subgroup established within the bilateral dialogue framework and would involve representatives of the relevant authorities.
- Planning for joint training. One potential venue is Jeju Island in South Korea, a former military base on an island off the southern coast of South Korea and now a centre for peace-promoting activities. Alternatively, training could take place at a suitable location in North Korea.

Following successful cooperation in joint search and rescue at sea, similar steps could be taken for preparation of cooperation in case of other emergencies, such as natural disasters.

B3. Enhancing military transparency

A number of measures could be implemented in order to enhance military transparency between North and South Korea. Sharing of military information not only helps reduce the risk of misunderstandings, but may itself contribute to building an atmosphere of cooperation and goodwill. As is the case with most things regarding North Korea, limited information is publicly available about the North Korean military and its activities. Estimates have been made about the total number and composition of the armed forces, and about deployment and activities of the forces. Some information is also available (although not from North Korean sources) on the annual North Korean military training programme. (This begins around December and finishes around October of the following year. The larger exercises—at regimental, brigade, division and corps level—are conducted around August–October.) However, this information must be considered at best unreliable. Analysts have, indeed, questioned whether major exercises are still being conducted by North Korea at all, in view of chronic shortages. Information is also lacking on the North Korean arms industry, which in the past was thought to be rather considerable. Today it is suspected to be greatly reduced, as has been the case with other North Korean heavy industries.

Largely due to the secrecy of the North Korean Government and the lack of a stable peace regime, South Korea has traditionally also been reluctant to make public information about its military and its activities. This has positively changed in recent years, most notably owing to the producing and publishing of defence White Papers. Information is today also available on the annual US–South Korean joint military exercises. These exercises include the ‘Foal Eagle’ and ‘Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration’ (RSOI) exercises carried out annually in March–April. The exercises are normally branded by North Korea as preparations for an attack on the North. Military matters do, nevertheless, remain highly secret in South Korea, as is evidenced by the continued poor availability of information on South Korean arms production (Surry).

Enhancing military transparency has been an important aspect of CBM regimes in other regions. In Europe, the (voluntary) prior notification of and basic information on large-scale land military exercises and movements were among the first CBMs agreed to under the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. These measures have also been copied and adapted to other regions. The 1991 Agreement on Advance Notice of Military Exercises between India and Pakistan provides for prior notification of land, naval and air exercises. Agreements between India and China (1996) and in Central Asia (1996) have also provided for the advance notification of military exercises.

Under the Basic Agreement, the Joint Military Commission was mandated to discuss the mutual notification of large-scale military exercises and movements. Since the JMC was never convened, such discussions never began and have not figured in the bilateral discussions since.

The following measures could be implemented in order to enhance military transparency on the Korean peninsula following the start of a peace process.

MEASURE 11

PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF LARGE-SCALE MILITARY EXERCISES

Such a measure has been an important part of CBM regimes in other regions. The first step that would be needed in order to implement a similar regime on the Korean peninsula would be for the two parties to agree on the following issues within the bilateral framework.

- The definition of what would constitute a ‘major’ exercise for land forces. This has varied between regions. For land exercises, examples range from the Helsinki Final Act, which set the limit at 25 000 personnel, to the 1996 China–India agreement,

which set the limit at 5000 personnel in border areas. Elsewhere, a limit of 12 000 personnel has been suggested for the Korean peninsula (see Vannoni et al.). Agreements in other regions have also included criteria relating to numbers of weapons, such as the 1986 Stockholm Document, which included exercises where, for example, 300 or more battle tanks participated.

- Similar definitions would have to be made for air exercises. The Stockholm Document and the successive CSBM accords defined major air exercises in terms of number of sorties, placing the limit at 200. Other agreements have chosen to focus on the number of aircraft participating in the exercise, such as the 1991 agreement between India and Pakistan, which placed the limit at the level of Regional Command. One source has suggested a limit of 36 aircraft participating for the Korean peninsula (Vannoni et al.).
- Definitions would also have to be made for naval exercises. Examples here include the 1991 India–Pakistan agreement, which suggested the participation of six or more ships of destroyer/frigate size. A limit of 6 naval vessels participating has been suggested for the Korean peninsula (Vannoni et al.).
- The area of application needs to be decided on. In some regions (e.g. Europe), exercises conducted anywhere on the territory of the participating states have been notifiable. In other regions, exercises have only become notifiable if conducted within a certain distance of the mutual border (e.g. the India–Pakistan agreement set the limit at 75 km from the border for land exercises).
- It seems rather obvious that the area of CBM application should cover the whole of the Korean peninsula given its relatively small size and the security significance for each Korean state of exercises conducted also in rear areas of the other country. However, the fact that in the north the DPRK adjoins two other countries: China and Russia, creates the sensitive issue of whether those border areas should be subject to a CBM zone on both sides, something that Moscow and Beijing might or might not accept (especially if they felt that no comparable restraints had been laid on US or Japanese activities). If necessary in this context, a northern border strip could be excluded from the area of application. An alternative would be for North Korea and its two northern neighbours to reach border CBM or disengagement agreements separately between themselves. Likewise, the area of application may cover adjoining sea areas, and consequently the naval forces stationed and operating there. Extending constraints beyond the forces of the two Koreas themselves could, however, be a very controversial issue due to the US position, in particular.
- The time in advance that exercises have to be notified has to be agreed upon. In the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, the limit was set at 21 days in advance. This was extended to 42 days in the 1986 Stockholm Document. The 1991 India–Pakistan

agreement set the amount of time in advance according to the size of the exercise (30 days for divisional level exercises; 60 days for corps level; 90 days above corps level). For the Korean peninsula, the time limit should be as long as possible, but at least 21 days in advance. Some regions (e.g. Europe) have also chosen to report annually on the planned notifiable exercises for the coming years.

- An agreed format for the notifications needs to be defined, as well as the information that should be included in the notifications. In other regions, agreements have called for notifications to include information on the purpose, type of exercise, number of forces participating, the general geographical area and duration (*vide* India–Pakistan, India–China and China–Russia + 3). Similar information ought to be included in an agreement on the Korean peninsula.
- Agreement needs to be reached on where the notifications will be made. On the Korean peninsula, it would preferably be made within the bilateral dialogue framework.
- Finally, consideration needs to be given to whether the information exchanged about exercises would be publicly available, as in Europe, or whether it would be confidential, as is the case with the information exchanged between Russia and China. In the case of the Korean peninsula, the latter would probably be more acceptable for both North Korea and South Korea, at least at the initial stages.

MEASURE 12

EXCHANGES OF OTHER MILITARY INFORMATION

The regular exchange of other military information, in addition to the prior notification of military exercises, has played an important role in CBM regimes in other regions. In the case of India and China, their agreement included provisions for the exchange of data on the number of forces and armaments deployed along their mutual border, as well as on the number by which forces would be reduced. The same provision was included in the Shanghai Agreement. Within the ARF and OAS frameworks, member states have been encouraged to produce and share defence White Papers (although not all member states of these organizations have done so) as well as participate in UNROCA.

The following measures could be considered at some stage for the exchange of military information:

- As a UN member, North Korea could begin participating in the military information exchange regimes of the United Nations. Under UNROCA, participating states are required to annually submit information on their international arms transfers, their holdings and procurement through national production of armaments in the following categories: battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles and missile launchers. South

Korea already participates in this arrangement. Information submitted to the UN could also be exchanged bilaterally between North and South Korea.

- The DPRK could begin participating in the military information exchanges of the ARF, of which North Korea has been a member since 2000. One important CBM under this arrangement is the production and exchange of defence White Papers among ARF participants, in which South Korea already participates. Defence White Papers could be exchanged bilaterally between North and South Korea, in addition to among the other members of the ARF. If North Korea goes along with such an arrangement, it is likely to require some outside methodological assistance with producing its own defence White Paper. This could be included in the capacity-building programmes mentioned above, and special instruction on the subject could be given by European or Asian states.
- North and South Korea could regularly exchange, within the bilateral dialogue framework and in accordance with an agreed format, information on the following:
 - ~ Military infrastructure and fortifications, including mine fields, within the DMZ. Both North and South Korea have a number of installations within the DMZ, such as bunkers and guard towers.
 - ~ Total number of armed forces, preferably including more detailed information on the number of forces designated to the different branches of the armed forces (land, sea, air force).
 - ~ Size and deployment of major military units, especially those close to the DMZ.
 - ~ Holdings of certain categories of heavy armaments, particularly those stationed close to the DMZ. The following categories should be included: battle tanks, armoured vehicles, artillery, aircraft and battle ships.
 - ~ Information on the respective missile programmes of the two states.
 - ~ Information on respective military expenditures. This would require agreement on a common methodology regarding what to include when compiling the total of military expenditure. The OSCE states use the UN Instrument for Standardized International Reporting of Military Expenditure as the basis. The OAS member states have been working on developing such a common methodology.
 - ~ Acquisitions of agreed categories of armaments, both from international arms transfers and from national production.

Given the degree of difficulty and intrusiveness of most such exchanges, it is likely that many of the options (such as reporting on military spending) could only be introduced at later stages of the evolving confidence-building process.

MEASURE 13

INVITATION OF INSPECTION TEAMS

In order to verify certain categories of the information exchanged, North and South Korea could mutually agree to exchange observers and evaluating teams. Such mutual exchanges of inspectors, especially to military exercises, have been an important part of CBM regimes in other regions. In Europe, voluntary exchanges of observers of military exercises were one of the original CBMs included in the Helsinki Final Act. Under the Stockholm Document, the invitation of observers was made obligatory for exercises involving more than 17 000 troops or 5 000 amphibious or airborne forces. Similarly, the Shanghai Agreement called for the invitation of observers to military exercises, conducted in the border area, involving more than 35 000 troops (obligatory), 25 000 troops (mutual basis) or 13 000 troops and 300 battle tanks (voluntary and on a mutual basis). Such observation missions could be used to verify the following information on the Korean peninsula:

- The size of manoeuvres conducted during military exercises. Apart from verifying the information exchanged, the mutual invitation of observers to military exercises may serve as a CBM in its own right.
- The evaluation of installations and fortifications reported within the DMZ. This could then form the basis for possible dismantling of such infrastructure (see measure 17).
- Deployment of forces and armaments in areas close to the DMZ. This could then form the basis for the disengagement of forces close to the DMZ (see measure 18).

An alternative to the mutual exchange of observers and evaluators would be to create international observation/evaluation teams that could conduct the above-mentioned inspections, in whole or in part. These international teams would then provide regular reports on their findings to the Pyongyang and Seoul authorities, possibly through the bilateral dialogue framework or the conflict management/conflict prevention centre. Such an arrangement could build on the experience of the NNSC as mandated under the Armistice Agreement (see chapter 5). Inspection teams could also be composed of both Korean and international personnel.

In order to establish an inspection regime, the following would need to be decided:

- The number of observations/evaluations each state has to accept per year.
- The parameters for when the invitation of observers/evaluators becomes obligatory (cf. the above examples from other regions).
- The composition of the inspection teams.
- Practical issues, such as arrival, exit and travel of observers/evaluators across the DMZ, accommodation, as well as freedom of movement of the observers.

C. Specific measures for land forces

Alongside the above-mentioned measures applying to all branches of the armed forces, a number of CBMs could be envisioned that would apply specifically to the land forces of the two sides. In many respects, the threat posed by conventional land armed forces and armaments has been the most serious and central issue on the peninsula since the Korean War ended. The following CBMs may be considered for ground forces following the start of a peace process.

C1. CBMs for the Demilitarized Zone

The demilitarized zone was created by the Armistice Agreement at the end of the Korean War as a buffer zone between the armed forces of North Korea (and the Chinese ‘volunteers’) and the US-led UN forces. It extends for 2 km either side of the Military Demarcation Line (MDL), and runs from coast to coast.

Although the DMZ is supposed to be completely demilitarized, a number of fortifications and military installations exist within it on both sides of the MDL. They include bunkers and guard towers, as well as tunnels dug by North Korea. Both sides of the DMZ are heavily mined, a legacy of both the Korean War and the subsequent confrontation. Furthermore, incidents occur within and along the DMZ. Although these incidents are usually relatively minor, they serve to maintain a relatively high level of tension across the DMZ.

Not much has been done so far to reduce this tension. An agreement reached at General-level Talks in 2004 led to the cessation of the propaganda activity across the DMZ by both sides, including the near complete removal of relevant equipment, such as loudspeakers and billboards.

The following measures could be implemented to increase predictability and confidence within and along the DMZ.

MEASURE 14

ESTABLISHMENT OF A CODE OF CONDUCT FOR ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE DMZ

In order to increase predictability and avoid incidents arising out of misunderstandings, a code of conduct for activities within the DMZ could be established. Such a code of conduct would include the following (Vannoni et al.):

- Establishment of a certain number of fixed entry and exit points. Entry and exit to and from the DMZ should only be permitted through these points.

- Patrols inside the DMZ should take place according to an agreed fixed schedule and along previously agreed routes. Deviation from the fixed schedule or routes should only be permitted after obtaining prior agreement from the other side.
- There should be an agreed procedure for dealing with breaches of the code of conduct. As a first step, this should include communication using the various bilateral hotlines discussed above.

The implementation of the code of conduct, including breaches and their lessons, should be regularly reviewed within the bilateral dialogue framework. Further provisions to be added to the code of conduct should also be discussed and adopted within that framework.

MEASURE 15

INTERNATIONAL OBSERVATION OF THE DMZ

Another CBM could be to establish a mission of international observers within the DMZ. These international observers could either perform their functions side-by-side with the North and South Koreans, or play an independent role in monitoring within the DMZ.

There are several precedents for such arrangements from other regions. The annex to the 1975 Interim Agreement between Israel and Egypt established an early warning system to be located within the demilitarized zone. This was to be manned by US civilian personnel. Under the 1979 Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt, monitoring of the demilitarized zone established on the Sinai peninsula was entrusted to UN peacekeepers. The UN force was to operate checkpoints, carry out patrols and man observation posts both along the borders of the demilitarized zone and within it. Likewise, UN observers were mandated to observe and monitor the demilitarized zone established on the Golan Heights under the 1974 Syrian–Israeli Disengagement Agreement, and UN peacekeepers are still monitoring the demilitarized zone between North and South Cyprus.

An international force stationed in the DMZ should have the status of observers rather than peacekeepers (at least at early stages of the peace process), and its functions would be limited to observing and reporting on activities within the DMZ, not enforcing it. Unlike in the examples cited above, where the UN has played a major role in such missions, the role of the UN in the Korean War—and the continued designation of the US forces in South Korea as being under ‘UN Command’—would probably inhibit the UN from heading such an observation mission. Instead, it would be feasible to use the experience gained by the member states of the NNSC for this task, even though the body as such, by virtue of its association with the Armistice Agreement,

could be difficult for the DPRK to accept. The international observation of the DMZ could be combined with the verification observations carried out in the context of the information exchanges (see measure 12). The international observers could perform the following functions.

- Manning of observation towers both within and along the borders of the DMZ. This could either be done in cooperation with North and South Korea, or solely by the international observers.
- Carrying out patrols within the DMZ.
- Establishing and operating an early warning system within the DMZ. Such a system could be based on sensors, set up along the borders of the DMZ.
- Monitoring and reporting any breaches of the DMZ, submitting their reports to both North and South Korea.

MEASURE 16

JOINT MONITORING OF THE DMZ BY NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA

Once a certain level of trust and confidence has been built between North and South Korea, some tentative forms of joint monitoring of the DMZ could be implemented. Such joint monitoring could take place on a bilateral basis, or in cooperation with international observers. The following may be considered as options for cooperative monitoring.

- The joint manning of select guard towers by North and South Korean observers in the DMZ.
- Another option that has been suggested is to install unattended sensors within the DMZ, and thereby remove or reduce the need for patrols (Vannoni et al.). Information gathered from the use of the sensors could then be shared between the two parties within the bilateral dialogue framework.

C2. Further military disengagement

The forward deployment of forces on both sides of the DMZ is currently the greatest threat to peace on the Korean peninsula. On the North Korean side, it has been estimated that around 70 per cent of the armed forces are deployed south of the Pyongyang–Wonsan line. Along with this massive manpower, much of North Korea’s heavy offensive armaments are also deployed in these areas. In particular, North Korea is estimated to have stationed large amounts of long-range artillery along the northern border of the DMZ, some of which are capable of reaching Seoul. A similar forward deployment is evident on the South Korean side. The USA still has ‘tripwire’ forces forward deployed close to the DMZ. As part of the overall realignment of US forces in South Korea, these forces

are currently being redeployed to bases further south in the ROK. This may be interpreted as a unilateral CBM by the USA if accompanied by relevant security assurances. In the absence of such assurances, the DPRK may well interpret the move as destabilizing. The following steps may be taken in order to further the disengagement of armed forces on the Korean peninsula.

MEASURE 17

REMOVAL OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS WITHIN THE DMZ

As noted above, military installations and fortifications are maintained on both sides of the MDL within the DMZ. In addition, mine fields exist on both sides. A schedule could be set for the removal of all these installations and mine fields in the DMZ. This could be done according to a fixed schedule, and could be continuously verified through the exchange of inspectors, or alternatively by the international observation mission (see measure 15). Some of the guard towers could also be dismantled.

MEASURE 18

CREATION OF ZONES OF LIMITED DEPLOYMENT BEYOND THE DMZ

An agreement could be reached on the creation of zones of limited deployment on either side of the DMZ. This measure would build on the model developed in the 1979 Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt, which resulted in a demilitarized zone on the Sinai peninsula. Further zones were created beyond the demilitarized zone, and limits were placed on the number of troops and armaments that could be deployed in these zones.

Furthermore, the number of military installations and fortifications were not to exceed the necessities of the limited number of troops stationed in the zones. A similar arrangement was implemented between Syria and Israel under their 1974 Agreement on Disengagement.

Implementing such an arrangement on the Korean peninsula would build on the declarations and verifications of the number of troops and armaments stationed along the DMZ by each side. The following issues will also need to be agreed on within the bilateral dialogue framework:

- The size of the zones of limited deployment. Some analysts have suggested that these zones be asymmetrical, extending further on the northern side than on the southern, due to the vulnerable location of Seoul only 50 km from the DMZ. One such proposal suggests that the zone extend 10–20 km on the southern side and 30–40 km on the northern side (Yong-Sup Han; Møller).

- The limits on forces and armaments deployed within the zones of limited deployment. The following categories of armaments would be limited under the agreement: battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery.

Following agreement on the above issues, a schedule should be set for the withdrawal of forces and armaments. This can be done in several stages. In the Israel–Egypt Peace Treaty, the timeframe for the full implementation of the agreement was three years, and it was to be completed in two stages. On the Korean peninsula, given the amount of time that the forces have been fortified on each side, the timeframe should probably be longer than this, possibly five to seven years.

- Verification of the withdrawals. This could be done either through further exchanges of inspections, or by the international observation mission.

There are two issues that would have to be taken into account in connection with such a withdrawal process.

First, the importance of geography has already been noted. The forward deployment of North Korean forces close to the DMZ must primarily be understood in terms of North Korea's military and political strategy, but probably has much to do also with the largely mountainous character of the country further north. It may be the case that North Korea would have major difficulty to redeploy large parts of its armed forces to these areas, particularly its heavy armaments.

Second, the financial costs of such a venture should be addressed, preferably in an international setting. Since North Korea would most probably not be able to finance a significant dismantlement and relocation programme on its own, financial assistance from outside donors would be necessary. The European precedent was German aid and assistance in redeploying the Soviet/Russian troops and equipment back home in the early 1990s. Moreover, it is possible that North Korea would require some form of technical assistance in relation to the redeployment of its forces.

D. Specific naval and maritime confidence-building measures

Although neither North nor South Korea possesses very large naval forces, several incidents have occurred between them on the seas. The main source of tension is the disputed maritime boundary between the two states in the West Sea (Yellow Sea). North Korea does not recognize the UN Command's Northern Limit Line (NLL), arguing that it was not included in the Armistice Agreement. It instead wants a line to be drawn south of the NLL, something that South Korea and the UN Command are not prepared to accept. At

the root of the disputed maritime border is the very profitable crab fishing in the area. Clashes between the two navies took place in 1999 and 2002 during the crab fishing season. Since these clashes, naval CBMs have figured prominently in the bilateral dialogue between North and South Korea. Some agreements have also been reached. The 2004 General-level Talks resulted in an agreement to establish a naval hotline as well as other means of communication, such as signalling. Although the naval hotline has not been effectively implemented, it has been tested and could be employed once the necessary political conditions exist.

At various bilateral meetings during 2004–2005, the two sides have also agreed to a number of CEMs in an effort to enhance maritime cooperation. In June 2004, a maritime agreement was signed that among other things regulates maritime transport in these territorial waters of the two Koreas. Furthermore, in bilateral working-level talks, agreements have been reached on cooperating against illegal fishing by third countries in their territorial waters as well as a joint fishing zone in the East Sea (Sea of Japan). An agreement in July 2005 established a fisheries cooperation committee ‘for peace and joint interests of fishermen of the two Koreas in the West Sea’. However, this committee has still to deliver any concrete results.

A number of additional measures may be envisioned to further enhance naval and maritime confidence building between the two Koreas.

MEASURE 19

A BILATERAL INCIDENTS AT SEA AGREEMENT

In order to avoid accidental clashes between the naval forces of North and South Korea, an agreement similar to the 1972 Incidents At Sea Agreement signed between the USA and the Soviet Union, which could be agreed between the two Koreas. The 1972 agreement includes a number of CBMs for naval forces.

For example, ships are to take precautions to avoid collisions and not simulate attacks against ships of the other party. Advance notice is to be given of dangerous activities on the high seas. Signalling and other forms of communication are to be used to convey intentions. Finally, the parties meet once a year to review the implementation of the agreement. The 1973 protocol to the 1972 agreement stipulated that the provisions also apply in relation to non-military ships. A plan to establish a military hotline between the air and navy forces of China and South Korea to handle unforeseen situations in the West Sea was reported in spring 2007. As described above, many of these functions are already served by existing North–South agreements. However, an

'incidents at sea' agreement could be beneficial, and could incorporate all the already existing agreements. Such an agreement would, however, have to be adapted to the specific context of the Korean peninsula.

Unlike the US–Soviet agreement, which was designed to apply on international waters and have global applicability, a bilateral agreement between North and South Korea would have to apply primarily in the waters surrounding the peninsula, including both international and territorial waters. Rather than discussing incidents at yearly meetings, these should be taken up as soon as possible due to the potential for escalation. This could be done within the bilateral dialogue framework, or in a subcommittee thereof.

MEASURE 20

MUTUAL VISITS TO PORTS

A further measure to enhance contacts between the navies of the two states would be to promote visits of their respective navies to ports. An example of such an arrangement is that agreed between Finland and Russia in 2002, according to which the navies of the two states biannually visit each other's naval bases/ports. Similar arrangements were also included in the 2002 document on naval CBMs in the Black Sea region signed by Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine.

Such a measure would build on the 2004 agreement regulating civilian maritime transport, under which civilian vessels would be treated equally within each other's ports. In the military sphere, an agreement could be reached for military ships of each side to make one or more visits per year to military ports of the other side. In South Korea, several military ports could host such visits, such as the deep-water port in Busan. North Korea has a number of naval bases on both the east and west coasts. The West Sea fleet has its headquarters at Nampo, while the East Sea fleet has its headquarters at Toejo-dong. These bases would probably be capable of hosting visits from the South Korean navy.

MEASURE 21

ESTABLISHING A JOINT FISHING ZONE AND A JOINT FISHING VENTURE IN THE WEST SEA

A Joint Fishing Zone could be established in the West Sea along the disputed NLL, where naval clashes have taken place in the last few years. This has been a topic of discussion at bilateral talks between the two states, although an agreement has not yet been reached. A Joint Fishing Zone in the West Sea is another CBM/CEM that has been studied by researchers both in South Korea and abroad.

One such proposal (Vannoni et al.) envisions the following two possible cases for a Joint Fishing Zone in the West Sea:

- Between the NLL and South Korea's 'red line' (drawn unilaterally by South Korea approximately 5.6 km south of the NLL, beyond which vessels are not allowed in order to prevent incidents from occurring).
- 3 km either side of the NLL.

In addition, the proposal suggests the following features of the Joint Fishing Zone:

- The boundaries of the zone would be marker buoys equipped with flashing lights, radar reflectors as well as Global Positioning System (GPS) capabilities.
- Designated vessels from each side would cooperatively patrol the joint zone. These designated vessels should be clearly marked and should be jointly manned by North and South Korean inspectors.
- No military vessels would be allowed to enter the Joint Fishing Zone.
- The designated patrol vessels would be able to detain foreign vessels fishing within the zone.

The proposal also envisions a Joint Fishing Venture within the Joint Fishing Zone:

- A joint fish processing facility would be designated, possibly in North Korea.
- Only registered fishermen from each side would be permitted to fish within the zone, and would deliver their catch to the processing facility.
- The processed fish would be sold locally and internationally, and the profits would be split equally between North and South Korea.
- The Joint Fishing Venture would be monitored and managed by a Joint Fishing Commission (JFC). The JFC, which would meet regularly, would also handle vessel registrations and monitor catch quotas.

E. Aerial and space confidence-building measures

This section is divided into a general part on aerial and space CBMs, and a second part on missiles, due to their pertinence in the Korean context.

E1. General aerial and space measures

In comparison with the tension created on the Korean peninsula by the forward deployment of land forces and the occasional clashes of naval forces in the West Sea, there have been surprisingly few incidents involving the respective air forces. Both parties have sought to avoid aerial incidents and have largely respected the terms of the Armistice Agreement, which prohibited military aircraft from flying over the DMZ.

A few isolated aerial incidents have, however, occurred in the past. For instance, a crisis was sparked in 1969 when a US helicopter was shot down by North Korean forces after having crossed into North Korean airspace. As this incident demonstrates, any CBM accord regulating the activities of air forces would have to cover US aircraft as well. The USA currently deploys the 7th Air Force as part of United States Forces Korea (USFK), with the headquarters at Osan Airbase, located 60 km south of Seoul. The following CBM could be envisioned for air forces.

MEASURE 22

EXTENSION OF THE NO-FLY ZONE

In order to further reduce the risk of incidents involving the air forces, the no-fly zone over the DMZ could be extended. Such an agreement could be based on the 1991 Agreement on the Prevention of Air Space Violation between India and Pakistan. Under this agreement, the respective combat aircraft were prohibited from flying within 10 km of each other's air space.

The following would need to be agreed on in order to extend the no-fly zone:

- The distance the no-fly zone would extend on either side of the DMZ. A distance of 5 km could be suggested.
- Establishing procedures for handling possible breaches of the no-fly zones. Such procedures could involve:
 - ~ Making contact using the communications hotline.
 - ~ Referring the matter to the bilateral dialogue framework/crisis-management/conflict prevention centre.

E1.1. Cooperative aerial and space monitoring

In order to further enhance military transparency on the Korean peninsula, the two Koreas could agree to a regime of cooperative aerial monitoring. Such an arrangement could be based on the Open Skies Treaty in Europe. Under this treaty, each participating state is permitted to make a certain number of unarmed overflights of other participating states in order to observe military forces and activities. Each state is obliged to accept a certain number of such overflights by other member states. Precedents for cooperative aerial monitoring also exist in the Middle East. In particular, the disengagement agreements between Israel and Egypt and Syria of 1974–75 provided for observation flights to be carried out by the UN observer missions stationed there.

At the later stages of the confidence-building process the idea of extending the open skies regime to other states of the region could be considered and promoted.

The following options could be considered to implement cooperative aerial monitoring on the Korean peninsula.

MEASURE 23

OBSERVATION FLIGHTS CLOSE TO MUTUAL BORDER

Building on experience in the Middle East (Krepon; Constable), an agreement could be reached permitting unarmed observation flights by each side within the DMZ, but on their own side of the MDL. This would allow for both aerial observation of the DMZ and, depending on the level of technical equipment on-board the flights, observation of activities in the areas adjoining the DMZ. Agreement would have to be reached on the technical level of the equipment permitted on-board the flights.

MEASURE 24

BILATERAL OPEN SKIES AGREEMENT

Another option would be for the two Koreas to agree to a bilateral version of the Treaty on Open Skies. The following issues would have to be addressed within the bilateral dialogue framework:

- Number of flights that can be conducted per year. Under the Open Skies Treaty, each state is obliged to receive up to three overflights per year. In the context of the Korean peninsula, it may be possible to agree to more flights. For instance, mutual overflights could be carried out on a monthly basis, according to a fixed schedule.
- The level of resolution for images of ground objects of the observation equipment on-board the aircraft. This is restricted under the Open Skies Treaty. Similar restrictions could be made on equipment in the Korean context.
- Composition of the flight crews. The Open Skies Treaty permits representatives from the host state to be present during observation flights. This would also be advisable in the Korean context.
- Availability of the data collected. As under the Open Skies Treaty, all the data collected during observation flights should be shared between both parties.
- The issue of sharing the costs of implementation (the measure is very expensive) should be addressed, including the possibility of external assistance.
- Assistance from the NNSC countries with regard to both financial aspects and demonstrations is advisable (see chapter 5).

MEASURE 25

AERIAL OBSERVATION BY INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS

Another option would be for aerial observation flights to be carried out by international

observers. This would build on the experience of the disengagement agreements signed by Israel with Egypt and Syria in 1974–75. Under these agreements, observation aircraft were based in the respective demilitarized zones and were operated by the UN peacekeepers and observers, with significant assistance from the USA. These observation flights provided a complement to the on-site inspections carried out by the UN forces.

MEASURE 26

SHARING SATELLITE INTELLIGENCE

A unilateral CBM could be offered by the USA to share with North Korea low-resolution satellite intelligence of the border area between North and South Korea. Furthermore, help for North Korea to acquire commercial satellite photography with satisfactory resolution of imagery could be considered. (Google Earth is already available.)

E2. Specific measures for missile tests

In recent years, both North and South Korea have developed medium-range missiles capable of reaching the entirety of the other side's territory, as well as the territory of most of the states in North-East Asia. Tests of these missiles have the potential to increase both inter-Korean and regional tension. This was most recently demonstrated by the missile tests carried out by North Korea in July 2006. Security Council Resolution 1695 (15 July 2006) called for suspension of all North Korean ballistic missile-related programmes. Once the DPRK's denuclearization is advanced or completed, North Korean missile tests could be more internationally acceptable under certain conditions. Such arrangements would not be limited to the two Koreas only, but should preferably be extended to other actors in the region (e.g. Japan) The following measure may be considered in order to reduce the tension caused by missile tests on the Korean peninsula.

MEASURE 27

PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MISSILE TESTS

An agreement on the prior notification of missile tests could serve to reduce the tensions caused by missile tests carried out by either of the two Koreas. Notification is important in order not to endanger civil aviation and shipping. Such an agreement could be modelled on the 2005 Agreement on Pre-Notification of Missile Tests signed by India and Pakistan.

The following issues would need to be addressed in an inter-Korean agreement on missile tests:

- Timing of advance notice. In the India–Pakistan agreement, this is set at 72 hours in advance. A similar or, preferably, longer amount of time could be adopted to for an inter-Korean agreement.
- Which missiles would be covered by the agreement. The India–Pakistan agreement is limited to tests of ballistic missiles. In the inter-Korean case, given the proximity of strategically significant locations close to the border on both sides (most notably Seoul in South Korea), it would be advisable that pre-notification be agreed for all types of ballistic missiles.

E2.1. Constraints on missile launches

In addition to pre-notifications of missile tests, the two Koreas could also agree on placing constraints on the extent, nature and timing of such launches. Such an arrangement could again make use of the model developed by the 2005 India–Pakistan agreement.

MEASURE 28

CONSTRAINTS ON MISSILE FLIGHT PATHS

Under the India–Pakistan agreement, missiles were not allowed to fly within 40 km of the mutual border. A similar distance could be agreed between the two Koreas for tests of ballistic missiles. A shorter distance could be agreed for tests of shorter-range missiles.

MEASURE 29

CONSTRAINTS ON LANDING SITES OF MISSILES

Under the India–Pakistan agreement, missiles were not to land closer than 70 km to the mutual border. A similar distance could be agreed between the two Koreas.

MEASURE 30

EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON MISSILE PROGRAMMES

The two Koreas could exchange information on their respective missile programmes. The following information should be included in such an exchange:

- The types of missiles that have been developed, as well as the number of missiles currently in stock.
- The range of the various types of missiles.

MEASURE 31**MUTUAL AGREEMENT NOT TO CARRY OUT TEST DURING PEAK SEASONS**

Interested states could agree not to conduct missiles tests during the peak seasons (tourist, harvest, etc.). It can build on Greece–Turkey CBMs for aircraft flights.

F. Strengthening confidence through non-military measures

In contrast to the low levels of progress achieved with military confidence-building in the past, a number of cooperative projects have been pursued and implemented between North and South Korea in the non-military field. Although controversial, progress has been seen in the field of economics, people-to-people contacts and the establishment of frameworks for political and economic dialogue. This section gives an overview of the ongoing efforts and then lists further possible CBMs of a non-military nature.

F1. Pursuit of confidence enhancement: a balance sheet

The 1991 Basic Agreement included a chapter on ‘Exchanges and cooperation’ that emphasized economic exchanges and cooperation, such as increased trade and the establishment of joint ventures. Exchanges and cooperation were to take place in the field of science and technology, education, literature, sports, the environment and media. In addition, there would be free travel, contact and correspondence among people of the two states, and severed roads and railroads would be reconnected.

Unlike the ‘Non-aggression’ chapter of the Basic Agreement, which has seen almost no progress, the chapter on ‘Exchanges and cooperation’ has seen significant progress in implementation. This has largely been the result of the ‘sunshine policy’ adopted by then South Korean President Kim Dae-Jung (1998–2003). The essence of this policy, dubbed as the ‘separation of economy from politics’, was the use of private-sector led economic interaction to gain entry to North Korea and start building a basis for political trust and cooperation. The general direction of this policy has been maintained by the current South Korean President Roh Moo-Hyun under the name ‘Policy for Peace and Prosperity’.

Although some progress was seen in the late 1990s, most advances in the non-military field have been made since the inter-Korean summit of June 2000, where it was agreed to organize reunions of separated families and to promote economic cooperation and exchanges in the civic, cultural, sports, health and environmental fields. Indeed, the very different North–South relations of today, compared to only 10 or even five years ago, can largely be attributed to these non-military achievements.

Nevertheless, many of these measures have been criticized on several counts. Firstly, critics point to the apparent lack of reciprocity of most of these measures, emphasizing that 99 per cent of the cross-border visits that have been made so far have been made by South Koreans.

Second, those North Koreans who have visited the South have been carefully selected by the North Korean Government from certain sectors of society. Even the contacts that do take place, for example the family reunions, are strictly controlled by the DPRK authorities. The paragraph in the Basic Agreement calling for open and free travel and exchanges among ordinary citizens remains far from being implemented.

Third, North Korea usually demands large sums of money for contacts and exchanges to take place, which might suggest that Pyongyang is more interested in the financial profits than in genuine confidence-building.

Finally, criticism has been directed at the apparent lack of a connection between the non-military efforts and progress in the military sphere. The belief that non-military achievements would naturally spill over into the military sphere has not materialized, leading critics of the sunshine policy to suggest that tougher conditions should be attached to these efforts by the South Korean Government.

This criticism swelled again after the missile and nuclear tests carried out by North Korea during 2006. It has come from the USA, which has been trying to limit progress in the economic cooperation projects in an effort to further isolate North Korea, as well as from South Korea's own political opposition. President Roh has, however, stated that the economic cooperation projects will continue to develop.

In the wake of the 2000 Summit, the following accomplishments may be seen as CEMs.

F1.1. Frameworks for dialogue and cooperation

A number of frameworks for inter-Korean dialogue have been established. Foremost among these are the Ministerial Talks set up to implement the agreements made at the 2000 Summit. Although these meetings are organized on an ad hoc basis, and a number of the sessions have failed to reach results and collapsed, the fact that 19 such meetings have been held since 2000 suggests that this framework is now at least semi-institutionalized. The main focus of the discussions has been on economic cooperation, as well cultural and sporting exchanges. The concrete results of these discussions are discussed below.

Within the general framework of the Ministerial Talks, a series of subcommittees have been established in order to discuss specific issues, such as the Committee for the Promotion of Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation and the Inter-Korean Agricultural Cooperation Committee. Proposals have been made for establishing a committee on Inter-Korean Social and Cultural Cooperation. In addition, a number of working-level meetings have been held between representatives of the two states to work out the specific details of implementation of the various measures agreed.

F1.2. Economic cooperation projects

Three major economic cooperation projects have resulted from the Ministerial Talks, two of which are being implemented and have seen significant expansion since they began.

Kaesong Industrial Complex. Begun in 2003, the Kaesong Industrial Park was developed in the private sector jointly by Hyundai Asan and the Asia Pacific Peace Committee, and aims to combine cheap North Korean labour and land with South Korean capital and technology. The project can potentially serve some significant confidence-building functions. First, it is hoped that people-to-people contacts may be furthered over time by North and South Koreans working side by side (although under present conditions, the impact of this is dubious and likely to be very slow at best). Second, the industrial complex has security implications since Kaesong is located along one of the main invasion routes used during the Korean War, and North Korean artillery has had to be relocated from the area. Third, since the South Korean workers commute daily to Kaesong and most of the products produced there are transported back to South Korea, the complex has necessitated the opening up of transportation routes through the DMZ.

Mount Kumgang tourism. Another economic cooperation project has been the development of tourist tours that take South Koreans to visit Mount Kumgang, located just north of the DMZ, where a resort has been established. These tours were begun in 1998 with the tourists travelling by boat from the South to the North. Since September 2003, however, the trip had been made by land along roads that cross the DMZ. Over one million South Korean tourists have made the trip so far. This project also originated in the private sector, with Hyundai being the main benefactor.

These tours are conducted under strictly controlled conditions. The South Koreans are not permitted to have any contact with North Koreans not working at the resort, only take pictures of designated areas, and are not allowed to say anything negative about North Korea. Although the large number of tourists testifies to the success of the project, it has been the victim of similar criticism as the Kaesong Industrial Complex: that the project helps to prop up the North Korean system financially.

Just as with Kaesong, the Mount Kumgang project plausibly serves confidence-enhancing functions. It involves people-to-people contacts, although under strictly controlled conditions, through daily interactions between the North Korean workers at the resort and the South Korean tourists. Furthermore, the resort is located along the other main invasion route used during the Korean War, thus creating a relevant if rather flimsy obstacle to future armed conflict.

Reconnecting railroads and roads. The third economic project has been to reconnect severed railroads and roads across the DMZ in order to facilitate commercial transactions between North and South Korea. The two railroads designated for reconnection are the Kyungui line in the West, connecting Seoul and Pyongyang, and the Donghae line in the East, which would provide increased access to Mount Kumgang. Of the three projects, this is the one with the least success so far. Construction on the roads, which run alongside the railroad tracks, was completed in 2004. Although the reconnection of the railroads was completed in 2005, test runs with trains scheduled for October 2005 failed to materialize, as did the planned test runs in March 2006. The main problem has been the failure to reach agreement on military guarantees for the trains passing through the DMZ. The reconnection of the railroads and roads has required substantial cooperation between the militaries of the two sides, most significantly in de-mining parts of the DMZ but also in allowing construction workers to operate inside the DMZ. The completion and operation of the project would significantly increase the prospects for inter-Korean contacts and cooperation, especially in the economic field.

Interpersonal contacts. Apart from the people-to-people contacts that take place in Kaesong and at the resort in Mount Kumgang, such contacts have also been promoted through successive rounds of reunions of family members separated since the Korean War. The first such reunion was carried out in 1985. Since the 2000 Summit 10 such reunions have taken place and at least 10 000 family members have participated. The reunions have taken place alternatively at locations in the DPRK and in the ROK. A number of video reunions have also been organized since 2005.

Cultural and sporting exchanges. Since 2000, a number of cultural and sporting exchanges have also taken place between North and South Korea. In the cultural arena, the national orchestras of the two states have performed in the capitals of the other state and books have been published jointly by North and South Korean academics. In sports, the respective Taekwondo exhibition teams have made exchange performances, a North–South football match has been held, the North and South Korean squads entered the opening ceremony of the 2000 Sydney Olympics together, and North Korea sent a sizeable squad to participate at the 2002 Asian Games held in Pusan, South Korea (Jonsson).

F2. Options for further confidence-enhancing arrangements

The first part of this subsection lists measures dealing specifically with conflict issues. These are often more sensitive than CEMs not addressing a conflict issue, yet, if implemented, they have a far greater impact in supporting the peace process, as they actually work on the issues at stake. CEMs not addressing conflict issues are listed in the second part of the subsection. They may be undertaken if no movement is possible on the sensitive issues.

F2.1. Measures dealing with conflict issues

MEASURE 32

WILDLIFE SANCTUARIES

The isolation of the DMZ over several decades has made it into a unique wildlife reserve, serving as a home to several endangered species. Several proposals have been made for a wildlife sanctuary to be established in all or part of the DMZ to preserve the habitat and allow biological research in the area. Proposals have also been made to designate the DMZ as a UNESCO World Heritage Site. Creating wildlife sanctuaries in the DMZ would require the following:

- Suitable sectors of the DMZ would have to be identified, taking into account both the perspective of natural preservation and mutual security concerns.
- A North–South agreement would have to be signed guaranteeing the safety of researchers and workers operating inside the DMZ to establish the sanctuaries, as well as providing military escorts for them.
- The respective militaries would have to cooperate with de-mining of the designated areas, as well as the removal of unexploded ordnance.
- The sanctuaries would have to be clearly marked in order to avoid incidents with researchers stepping outside the areas.

Following these preparatory steps, a Joint DMZ Research Board could be established, composed of researchers from both Koreas in order to cooperate in the research.

MEASURE 33

REUNION CENTRE FOR SEPARATED FAMILIES

The construction of a permanent Family Reunion Centre has been a topic of discussion in the bilateral negotiation frameworks between North and South Korea. At the 15th Inter-Korean Ministerial Talks, which took place in Seoul in June 2005, it was agreed to hold a ceremony for the construction of such a centre at Mount Kumgang, as well as to carry out land and geological surveys for the centre. The idea is for the centre to serve

as a location where family reunions can take place, rather than holding them at ad hoc locations, as has been the case until now. Although Mount Kumgang is the location considered up to now, such a centre could also be located within the DMZ.

MEASURE 34

ESTABLISHING A 'PEACE MARKET'/'PEACE CITY'

Another proposal that has not figured in inter-Korean discussions but has been raised in academic circles is to establish a 'peace market' inside the DMZ. This would serve as a location for the exchange of goods between the two states and their respective populations. If agreement for the construction of such a peace market in the DMZ cannot be reached, its location could be considered within the Kaesong Industrial Complex. In an extended form, a 'peace city' concept could be considered with various regional convention centres, peace and security research and training centres, and so on, under UN auspices.

MEASURE 35

'DEALING WITH THE PAST' WORKING GROUP

Early in a peace process, a working group could be established to identify outstanding issues and possible common initiatives related to a process of Dealing with the Past (DwP). The working group could begin with the Japanese colonial period, for which a common North and South Korean interest exists, but would eventually also include the Korean War and the period up to the 1991 North–South Joint Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, and Cooperation and Exchange. The working group would identify DwP issues to be addressed and propose a process on how to do so. A useful conceptual framework for the working group on DwP is provided by the 'Joint principles', which were developed to combat impunity by Louis Joinet in his capacity as UN Special Rapporteur to the Sub-Commission on the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights. The 'Joint principles' identify four key areas which a working group of this nature would need to address: (a) the right to know; (b) the right to justice; (c) the right to reparations; and (d) the guarantee of non-repetition. Dealing with the past is a politically sensitive undertaking, but also an extremely important conflict-prevention measure. The political and social dimension of DwP is essential and should bring different kinds of actors (government and non-governmental organizations) together in a broader process of consultation. The governments of Sweden and Switzerland could play a facilitative role. Switzerland has experience of numerous peace processes of this kind.*

* Special thanks to Jonathan Sisson (Swisspeace) for his input to this section. (Bleeker, M. and Sisson, J.)

MEASURE 36**JOINT NORTH–SOUTH KOREAN NEGOTIATION/MEDIATION/FACILITATION WORKSHOPS**

Capacity building workshops to broaden North Korean negotiation capabilities have already been carried out by CASIN, Geneva. They could be taken further by the NNSC countries. To be a CEM, such workshops would need to be carried out jointly with North Koreans, also teaching additional skills such as mediation and facilitation. Since such workshops would not work on the substance of disputed issues, they should not be too sensitive and might be held early on during a peace process. Experts that have gone through the training could then be used to support talks between the North and South on various tracks. In the long term, such workshops are more sustainable if developed into ‘training of trainers’ programmes, where North and South Koreans would pass on the learned competencies to their compatriots.

MEASURE 37**TRACKS 1.5 AND 2 DIALOGUE PROCESS**

Besides the formal negotiations on track 1 (inter-governmental), other non-governmental actors (track 2) or officials acting in their personal capacity (track 1.5) can be involved in a process that aims at exchanging perceptions and preparing joint action. The issues to be addressed should be identified by the respective parties. Third parties can help in facilitating such a process (e.g. the Geneva Initiative in the Israeli–Palestinian context). It is likely, however, that such a process aiming at concrete action and not just the exchange of information could only be initiated once there is more flexibility from the top level. Thus, it would be difficult early on in a process. Later on it could be important to support the track 1 process and to link the governmental level with the wider civil society.

F2.2. Measures not directly dealing with conflict issues**MEASURE 38****ELABORATION OF A JOINT DICTIONARY OF THE KOREAN LANGUAGE**

The separation of the two Koreas, state control of the language in North Korea and, by contrast, considerable foreign influences on the language in South Korea, uneven access to and development in the terminologies in various fields of human activity, and so on, have resulted in the growing problems in communication between the peoples of the two halves of the Korean peninsula. A joint commission established to work out a joint Korean dictionary would be a tangible contribution to the cause of reconciliation

and mutual understanding (including in the literal sense). This would be followed later by publication of books, periodicals and so on in the Korean *koine*. At a later stage, taking advantage of the success of the Korean dictionary, further joint commissions dealing with such things as technical manuals (such as agricultural extension literature for farmers) and history textbooks could be considered, although endeavours in that category are bound to be controversial due to many hard-to-reconcile views on both sides.

MEASURE 39

INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF CULTURAL AND SPORTING CONTACTS

As outlined above, a number of cultural and sporting exchanges have taken place between North and South Korea, especially since the 2000 Summit. However, their impact on confidence building has been limited as these are usually isolated events without follow-up. Efforts should be made to regularize these contacts and make them more frequent and numerous, in order for their confidence-enhancement potential to be realized. The following are suggestions for how this could be done.

Centre for cultural exchange and cooperation. Such a centre could preferably be constructed in the DMZ but other locations could be considered as well, such as Mount Kumgang or Kaesong. This centre could have permanent exhibitions, initially focusing on such issues as the natural landscapes of the Korean peninsula or ancient Korean history. Politically sensitive exhibitions, such as the recent histories of the two states, should be avoided, but could be considered at later stages. The centre would also serve as the venue for cultural events, such as concerts. A monthly schedule of events could be agreed upon. Construction of such a centre would require similar steps as for the reunion centre and peace market (see measures 33 and 34), and could be constructed at the same location as these.

Regular sporting exchanges. The sporting exchanges that have taken place to date have been one-off events, such as the 2002 North–South football match held in Seoul and the exchanges of Taekwondo exhibition teams. Agreements could be reached to make these annual events, taking place alternately in South and North Korea. Such regular sporting exchanges would not have to be limited to the national teams, but could, for example, include youth football tournaments. Such events could initially involve only North and South Korean teams, but might later be extended to invited teams from other countries in the region.

MEASURE 40

FLOOD PREVENTION ON THE IMJIN RIVER

Preventing floods on the Imjin River, which flows through the DMZ, has been a subject of discussion at the inter-Korean talks. The river repeatedly floods during the rainy

season, causing damage on both sides of the border. Working-level meetings have been held on the issue, and in 2004 an agreement was reached to carry out a survey of the river basin. The North provided documents on weather and floodgates, while the South provided materials and equipment needed for the survey.

MEASURE 41

FURTHER FACILITATING INTER-KOREAN TRANSPORT—INTRODUCTION OF ELECTRONIC SENSORS

In order to make the transport of goods along the newly reconnected railways and roads as effective as possible, measures could be implemented to expedite the crossings at the border. Such a measure has been proposed by the Cooperative Monitoring Center (CMC). The measure envisages an electronic customs procedure based on a prototype developed for the USA–Mexico border. This would involve customs officials sealing each shipment at the factory of origin and placing on it an electronic seal. The customs form would be sent to the border via a secure Internet link, and the unbroken seal would allow border officials to pass the shipments without actually opening them.

MEASURE 42

JOINT DEVELOPMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES

There are significant mineral resources (e.g. graphite, iron ore, gold and coal) in North Korea. (There already exist Chinese–North Korean mining projects, such as the Musan iron ore mine on the border with China.) A possible cooperative economic project that could be pursued following the start of a peace process is for the South and the North to cooperate in developing these resources. This is a topic that has been discussed in the inter-Korean dialogue frameworks. At the 18th round of Ministerial Talks, held at Pyongyang in April 2006, the two sides agreed that further discussions would be held in the Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation Promotion Committee ‘to discuss issues of extracting construction materials at the estuary of the Han River and jointly developing national resources’. In 2003, South Korea’s Mining Promotion Corporation and North Korea’s Samcheoli Company reached an agreement on joint investment in the development of graphite deposits in North Korea, and plans were also considered for similar cooperation in developing other mineral resources.

Such cooperative projects could be developed following the start of a peace process. The following steps could be envisioned:

- Establishment of a Joint Mining Commission to administer the different projects.
- A number of agreements would have to be made, especially regarding the security of South Koreans working in North Korea.

- The example of the Kaesong Industrial Complex could be used, using inexpensive North Korean labour and South Korean technical skill and capital.
- Some minerals, such as coal, could be used in North Korea, while others, such as gold, could be exported through South Korean channels and the profits shared equally between them.

MEASURE 43

JOINT ENERGY PROJECTS

Gas pipeline from Russia. Another possible economic cooperation project would be the construction of a natural gas pipeline from gas fields in Russia, passing through north-east China and both Koreas. Both Koreas have shown interest in such a project. There is a need for external guarantees and financing within a broader regional institutional and political framework. There are three possible sources for Russian gas to be supplied to the Korean peninsula: the Kovyktinskoye field in the Irkutsk region, the Chayandinskoye field in Sakha Republic and the gas fields in Sakhalin. A feasibility study for pipeline the was completed in 2003. This is a very big project which would take several years to complete. A number of issues would also have to be resolved:

- Regional cooperation would be necessary between the two Koreas, Russia and China, and possibly also Japan, which has shown interest in extending gas pipelines to the Japanese mainland. A regional consortium could be established for this purpose.
- Private sector investors would need to be convinced of the worth of constructing a pipeline through North Korea, rather than along a sea route directly to South Korea.
- Other issues regarding the route of the pipeline would have to be resolved, such as whether it would pass through Mongolia.
- Unless the Kovyktinskoye field is chosen, feasibility studies would be required.

If it could be implemented despite these obstacles, the project could serve as a significant CEM between North and South Korea, necessitating considerable cooperation between the two states. In substance, it would serve both to alleviate the energy shortages in North Korea and help satisfy the increasing South Korean demand for energy.

Joint offshore oil exploration. During the 1990s, a number of foreign companies were given contracts to explore the potential oil reserves both onshore and offshore in the West Sea off North Korea. Reports from these explorations suggest that significant oil reserves may exist. However, none of these explorations has been sufficiently comprehensive to determine the real scale of North Korea's offshore oil potential. A joint project could be initiated involving the DPRK, the ROK and China to explore and develop the potential oil reserves. A joint effort could help to ease the maritime boundary disputes between the three states.

G. Confidence-building measures in the nuclear, biological and chemical fields

An important challenge for any future inter-Korean peace process will be how to deal with the DPRK's emergence as a de facto nuclear weapon state in a way that does not permit Pyongyang to retain its nuclear arsenal in perpetuity. Another key challenge will be to address any chemical and biological weapon (CBW) projects in the DPRK and, ultimately, to confirm that any CBWs are verifiably destroyed and that the infrastructure used to support offensive CBW programme activities is dismantled or converted to peaceful purposes.

The overarching political goal will be to achieve these objectives in a cooperative manner. The peaceful denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, in particular, remains a political touchstone for both North and South and is one of the principles guiding the Six-Party Talks, as set out in the September 2005 Joint Statement and reaffirmed in the February 2007 Denuclearization Action Plan. This in turn will require finding a diplomatic formula to put the North Korean nuclear 'genie' back into the bottle: that is, to formulate a viable and acceptable combination of incentives and disincentives that would persuade the DPRK to dismantle and eliminate its nuclear weapon programme in a verifiable way. This would involve the DPRK's rejoining the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS) party and fully implementing a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), including an Additional Protocol. To address international concerns about its suspected CBW programmes, the country should also join the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and take steps to show that it is a member in good standing of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), inter alia by actively participating in BTWC meetings. However, given the linkage of North Korean nuclear, biological and chemical programmes with wider security policy issues in the region, these goals are likely to be achievable only when these security issues have been addressed.

In the meantime, it is worth considering how to reinforce and advance an emergent peace process on the peninsula through a modest series of measures aimed at reducing NBC-related tensions and concerns. In the initial phase, these measures would seek to build confidence primarily in the context of bilateral relations between North and South Korea. At a later stage they could be expanded to draw in other regional powers.

G1. Building a nuclear CBM regime on the Korean peninsula

In principle, the basis for a nuclear CSBM regime in Korea already exists in the form of the 1992 North–South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Pursuant to the implementation of the Declaration, Seoul and Pyongyang established a Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC) through which they would conduct inspections of agreed sites chosen by each party on the other's territory. However, the negotiations in the JNCC on a reciprocal inspection regime quickly stalled over disputes about the frequency of inspections and number of sites to be visited, as well as over North Korea's insistence that it be allowed to inspect US military bases in the South to verify the withdrawal of US tactical nuclear weapons. The impasse highlights the difficulties involved in implementing ambitious, top-down declaratory agreements when the basic relationship between the parties is characterized by deep-rooted suspicion and mistrust.

Characteristics of a notional nuclear CBM regime on the Korean peninsula:

- Incremental bottom-up approach in which progress in implementing modest steps builds confidence and stimulates follow-on measures;
- Building confidence through cooperation on nuclear safety and security issues;
- Consideration of experiences of other regions in reducing nuclear tension and promoting non-proliferation goals;
- Non-recognition or non-legitimization of DPRK's status as a de facto nuclear weapon state; and
- International political acceptance of civilian nuclear activities in the DPRK, which may follow if North Korea rejoins the NPT and accepts IAEA full-scope safeguards.

The following measures could contribute, however modestly, to reducing nuclear-related tensions at the earliest stages of an emergent inter-Korean peace process. They could also help to address new proliferation risks and challenges arising from the DPRK's implementation of its commitment to verifiably abandon its nuclear weapon programme and all associated infrastructure.

MEASURE 44

CAPACITY-BUILDING AND TRAINING VISITS FOR DPRK NUCLEAR OFFICIALS

This measure is based on a broad definition of confidence building and would seek to promote the DPRK's compliance with international standards and practices in the civil nuclear industry for handling, storing and disposing of nuclear material. There is a direct precedent for this effort: North Korea participated with South Korea in IAEA-sponsored regional safeguards and physical protection training courses in 2000 and 2002. A country like Sweden, which has an advanced commercial nuclear power industry and also has amicable relations with the DPRK, could be instrumental in arranging capacity-building and training visits for North Korean nuclear scientists and administrators.

North Korean nuclear specialists would also benefit from study visits at the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the European Commission's Joint Research Centre in Luxembourg. These would be especially useful in circumstances where the DPRK persisted in limiting the IAEA's role in the country for political reasons.

MEASURE 45

NORTH–SOUTH NUCLEAR SCIENTIST-TO-SCIENTIST CONTACTS AND COLLABORATION

This measure is modelled on the US Department of Energy's laboratory-to-laboratory programme, which brings scientists and technicians from the USA's national laboratories together with their counterparts in Russia and elsewhere in the former Soviet Union to collaborate on improving fissile material control and accounting at nuclear facilities. The programme grew out of informal cooperation between a US and a Russian laboratory in the early 1990s, when the respective governments were reluctant to talk about their nuclear complexes and capabilities. It ended up serving as a major trust-building exercise between them and became an important element in the wider mix of cooperative threat reduction activities aimed at improving the safety and custodial security of sensitive materials in the former Soviet Union's nuclear weapon complex.

In the Korean context, the logical partners for initiating a similar programme would be the South's Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) at Daejeon and the North's Nuclear Research Centre at Yoongbyon. Although the latter is involved in military nuclear research and development activities as part of the DPRK's General Department of Atomic Energy, it also has a number of subsidiary research institutes focusing on basic research, and nuclear safety issues. In the initial phase, North–South scientific and technical cooperation could focus on fundamental research, safety procedures and risk assessments, and programmes involving medical isotopes and radioactive sources used in non-nuclear industry and agriculture. The programme could also serve as a foundation for collaboration on activities at the back-end of the fuel cycle, specifically, the storage and disposal of radioactive waste, where the North and South face common problems.

MEASURE 46

ESTABLISHING A NORTH–SOUTH SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH CENTRE

As trust was built over time, a Korean lab-to-lab initiative could move into a second, more formalized phase. This would involve the establishment of science and technology research centre (STRC) jointly staffed and operated by North and South Korea. The STRC would be structured in a manner that would allow for political and technical interaction on projects of mutual interest and which would have the flexibility to develop to better meet future political expectations and interests of the two states. Such a frame-

work would incorporate mechanisms and procedures whereby Korean facilities and individual researchers could propose joint projects in a given area according to agreed guidelines and procedures. The proposed projects would then be subject to a process of peer review prior to approval. Such a framework could also be structured in a manner that would allow the participation of other states with special technical expertise, including those having little or no regional political influence or expectations.

An important benefit of a joint STRC is that it would create a framework within which North Korean nuclear scientists and engineers would be offered new projects and research topics to occupy their skills in non-military areas.

This would be important for facilitating the long-term transition towards a denuclearized Korean peninsula. It would also reduce the temptation for North Korean scientists to transfer nuclear weapon-relevant knowledge to third parties, and thereby reduce the threat of future proliferation.

G2. Activities in the biological and chemical fields

Activities including scientific collaboration in biological and chemical fields will probably provide the earliest basis for a joint STRC, before nuclear-related ones. This could include projects to improve surveillance and response for diseases that occur in the region, as well as projects to address other health risks, including food and animal safety concerns. Projects could also be implemented to promote bio-safety or bio-security measures, including: physical security upgrades, the adoption and effective implementation of national regulations on pathogen strain transfers and the adoption of good laboratory practice (GLP).

G2.1. Military-related CBMs

MEASURE 47

HOSTING OF RECIPROCAL SITE VISITS OF CHEMICAL WEAPON-RELEVANT FACILITY

The DPRK and the ROK could agree to host reciprocal site visits to chemical weapon-relevant facilities on a managed access basis to serve as a confidence-building measure. This option partly depends on whether chemical weapon stockpiles still exist at the time of consideration of this option. This option could be partly based on the experience of the Soviet Union hosting selected foreign observers to the Shikhany military installation to view examples of Soviet munitions and technology for their destruction. The visit was partly designed to serve as a confidence-building measure to assist with

CWC negotiations by the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. If either party possesses chemical weapon destruction technology and equipment, it may wish to demonstrate them to the other party according to an agreed programme. Such site visits could eventually be made on a more regular basis.

MEASURE 48

ESTABLISHING A DPRK–ROK WORKING GROUP ON DEFENCE PLANT CONVERSION

Such a working group could provide a mechanism for the provision of defence plant conversion assistance and the sharing of best practices and lessons learned.

MEASURE 49

ESTABLISHING A KOREAN PENINSULA MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON CBW

Such a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), taking into consideration the experience of the Soviet–US 1989 MOU, could be based on two phases. The first would consist of an exchange of general data on relevant CBW holdings or capabilities. It could include visits to relevant civil and military facilities chosen by the host state in consultation with the visiting state. The second phase would entail formalization of data exchange and site visit procedures.

MEASURE 50

ESTABLISHING A JOINTLY OPERATED KOREAN OPCW ANALYTICAL LABORATORY

Parties to the CWC could nominate a laboratory to become officially designated to analyze samples taken by OPCW inspectors, including during challenge inspections. To be designated, a laboratory must be accredited by the OPCW. To retain its accreditation, the laboratory must participate in a proficiency testing programme at least once a year. The ROK has a designated laboratory. Following the DPRK's accession to the CWC, a special joint laboratory could, in principle, be established and nominated to become part of the OPCW laboratory network.

MEASURE 51

JOINT DPRK–ROK NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BTWC WORKING GROUP

The working group would identify the main types of provisions that should be incorporated into the national implementation of BTWC including: (a) adoption of national legislation, including penal legislation, which encompasses the full scope of BTWC prohibitions; (b) effective regulations or legislation to control and monitor transfers of relevant dual-use technologies; and (c) effective implementation and enforcement to prevent violations and to sanction breaches. This measure (and measure 52) will be difficult to adopt at the early stages of a peace process and is likely to be addressed

once headway has been made in institution building and governance programmes have progressed.

MEASURE 52

JOINT DPRK–ROK NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CWC WORKING GROUP

The working group would identify the main types of provisions that should be incorporated into the national implementation of CWC including: (a) adoption of national legislation, including penal legislation, which encompasses the full scope of CWC prohibitions; (b) effective regulations or legislation to control and monitor transfers of relevant dual-use technologies; and (c) effective implementation and enforcement to prevent violations and to sanction breaches.

G2.2. Confidence-enhancing measures

MEASURE 53

DPRK–ROK WORKING GROUP ON FOOD SAFETY

Food safety is an essential public health function. Better monitoring and surveillance to prevent food-borne disease overlaps with public health and animal health objectives. The working group could develop a risk analysis of the food chain on the Korean peninsula from production to consumption. The findings of the working group could facilitate broader cooperation on disease surveillance and response. Such a working group would facilitate the expansion of trade between the North and the South partly by addressing technical issues of food safety of joint concern.

MEASURE 54

DPRK–ROK FOOD-BORNE DISEASE OUTBREAK AND RESPONSE SURVEILLANCE UNIT

A provisional food-borne disease outbreak and response surveillance unit could be established to assist the investigation of suspected food-borne disease outbreaks on the Korean peninsula. The findings of the unit could provide the technical assessment for identifying and preventing a given food-borne illness in a given region.

MEASURE 55

JOINT DPRK–ROK WORKING GROUP ON PANDEMIC DISEASE OUTBREAK PREPAREDNESS

A working group could be established to determine the possibility of a pandemic disease outbreak on the Korean peninsula, and the possibilities of reducing the impact of

such an outbreak. The working group could develop a preparedness plan and monitor its implementation. Cross-sectoral cooperation and consultation among relevant ministries would have to be identified and agreed.

MEASURE 56

DPRK–ROK WORKING GROUP ON IMPLEMENTATION OF LABORATORY BIO-SAFETY

A working group on laboratory bio-safety could be established with a mandate to assess laboratory bio-safety practice on the Korean peninsula, develop best practice guidelines and issue periodic lessons-learned analyses. The working group could develop representative lists of pathogen strains and the corresponding bio-safety level at which they should be handled. It could also agree guidelines on laboratory equipment, transport of infectious substances, laboratory contingency plans and emergency procedures, safety organization and training, and appropriate personnel security measures.

MEASURE 57

DPRK–ROK WORKING GROUP ON BIOLOGICAL FORENSICS FOR THE INVESTIGATION OF CRIME

A biological forensics working group could be established to consider examples of DNA uses for forensic identification where a civil criminal offence has been committed and to develop joint guidelines on best practices. DNA uses for forensic identification include: identifying potential suspects whose DNA may match that contained in evidence left at the crime scene, identifying victims of a crime or natural disaster, identifying family relationships, and detecting and characterizing pathogens that present a health threat.